"Capital Stock and Unemployment: Searching for the Missing Link" by Ines Perez-Soba Aguilar et al.
 
 
Working Paper No.  475 
 
Capital Stock and Unemployment:  




Alfonso Palacio-Vera,  
Ana Rosa Martínez-Cañete,  
Elena Márquez de la Cruz,  
and  
Inés Pérez-Soba Aguilar, 




Address for correspondence: 
Alfonso Palacio-Vera (E-mail: apv@ccee.ucm.es) 
Departamento de Economía Aplicada III 
Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales 
Universidad Complutense de Madrid 




The Levy Economics Institute Working Paper Collection presents research in progress by 
Levy Institute scholars and conference participants. The purpose of the series is to 
disseminate ideas to and elicit comments from academics and professionals. 
 
The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, founded in 1986, is a nonprofit, 
nonpartisan, independently funded research organization devoted to public service. 
Through scholarship and economic research it generates viable, effective public policy 
responses to important economic problems that profoundly affect the quality of life in 
the United States and abroad. 
 
The Levy Economics Institute  
P.O. Box 5000 
Annandale-on-Hudson, NY 12504-5000 
http://www.levy.org 
 
Copyright © The Levy Economics Institute 2006 All rights reserved. ABSTRACT  
The purpose of this paper is to examine the proposition that capital stock relative to 
aggregate output has been an important variable in the determination of the U.S. 
NAIRU (Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment) over the last four decades. 
We present new empirical evidence, obtained from the application of the cointegrated 
VAR methodology to U.S. time-series data, that lends strong support to the claim that 
the aggregate capital-output ratio, the real price of imports, and aggregate capacity 
utilization were determinants of the NAIRU in the period considered. The same 
evidence also shows that technical progress and changes in long-term unemployment 
did not affect the NAIRU. We believe this evidence suggests that, insofar as the 
aggregate capital-output ratio is affected by changes in real interest rates, the stance of 
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The purpose of this paper is to examine the proposition that capital formation is an 
important variable in the determination of unemployment in the U.S. economy. Most of 
the literature on unemployment has focused on labor market issues, such as wage-fixing 
institutions, the role of welfare benefits and legal firing costs, and the quality and 
motivation of the labor force. However, there are other aspects of the unemployment 
problem which have been rather neglected. One such area is the relationship between 
unemployment and capital stock. Some economists have criticized this neglect and 
stressed the importance of capital stock for explaining unemployment. Some examples 
are the studies by Malinvaud (1986), Sneessens and Dréze (1986), Modigliani et al. 
(1987), Bean (1989), Rowthorn (1999), Allen and Nixon (1997), Sawyer (2002), and 
Stockhammer (2004). The link between capital stock and unemployment has also  
recently been the focus of attention of several studies that make use of modern time-
series analysis (Arestis and Biefang-Frisancho Mariscal 1998 and 2000). But these 
authors are in the minority and the conventional wisdom seems to be that persistent 
unemployment is mainly due to labor market rigidities.
1 This position is well 
exemplified in the influential work of Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (1991). In their 
impressive econometric study of OECD unemployment, they impose cross-equation 
restrictions which ensure that the rate of unemployment is unaffected by technical 
progress, as well as by changes in the aggregate capital-labor ratio. This position has 
become the conventional wisdom in macroeconomic analysis. For instance, Blanchard 
and Katz (1997) argue “any model should satisfy the condition that there is no long-run 
effect of the level of productivity on the natural rate of unemployment.”
2  
But the absence of such a trend in unemployment over very long periods does 
not imply that unemployment may not exhibit a trend over shorter periods, like several 
decades, or that unemployment may not be affected by, for example, changes in the 
                                                 
1 Notwithstanding this dominant view, there is the important issue of the blatant inconsistency between 
the widely recognized reduction in the number and importance of labor-market rigidities in European 
economies in the 80s and 90s and the observed rising trend in the rate of unemployment in many of these 
countries in the same period (Nickell 1997). Although some recent studies have shed some light on this 
issue (see for instance Blanchard and Wolfers 2000), the debate is still far from being settled. 
    
2 Blanchard and Katz (1997) discuss thoroughly a number of mechanisms through which this result will 
be accomplished.  
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aggregate capital-output ratio. In fact, unemployment has been on the rise in several 
European countries for almost two decades and this is attributed to a number of factors, 
including the generosity of European welfare systems and other related labor market 
rigidities, in a context of an increasingly competitive world economy (Siebert 1997). 
We do not wish to deny that globalization may, at least partially, explain the rise in 
European unemployment. However, we believe that another causal factor, albeit much 
ignored in the literature, is the role played by capital accumulation.  
One possible source of changes in labor productivity which has barely been 
discussed in the literature is changes in the aggregate capital-output ratio. A fall (rise) in 
the latter will transitorily reduce (increase) the rate of growth of labor productivity, thus, 
initially causing a mismatch between wage aspirations and labor productivity growth. 
Changes in the aggregate capital-output ratio may come about as a result of: (i) changes 
in technology, (ii) changes in the price of labor, vis á vis the rental price of capital, and 
(iii) changes in the pace of investment in physical capital for reasons other than (i) and 
(ii). In Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (1991), there are two reasons why changes in the 
capital-labor ratio do not influence the equilibrium level of unemployment. The authors 
point out that if the production function is Cobb-Douglas and benefit-replacement ratios 
are kept stable in real terms, then unemployment in the long run is independent of 
capital accumulation and technical progress.
3 For this to be the case, one has to assume 
that real wage aspirations adapt rapidly to changes in productivity growth. However, if 
workers demand real-wage increases based on their previous experience and only 
gradually adjust their demand to the new trend rate of productivity growth, then there is 
the possibility that shifts in productivity growth affect the NAIRU (Non-Accelerating 
Inflation Rate of Unemployment). Therefore, as a minimum, changes in the aggregate 
capital-output ratio are a potential source of changes in the NAIRU. To the best of our 
                                                 
3 They nonetheless mention in passing that “if, however, the elasticity of substitution is less than one, 
capital accumulation (with no technical progress) raises the share of labor and reduces unemployment” 
(Layard, Nickel, and Jackman 1991). Interestingly enough, Rowthorn (1999) shows that the bulk of the 
empirical estimates of the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor are well below unity and 
concludes that the assumption of a Cobb-Douglas production function (for which the elasticity of 
substitution is equal to unity) for most economies is inappropriate. Furthermore, and importantly, using a 
simple model based on the work of Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (1991), Rowthorn (1999) shows that, 
with an elasticity of substitution lower than unity, the equilibrium rate of unemployment is affected by 
technical progress, labor force expansion and capital accumulation. Unfortunately, a number of technical 
difficulties prevented us from utilizing a more general formulation, like a CES production function, rather 
than a Cobb-Douglas function. Use of a CES production function would have compelled us to implement 
non-linear estimation methods, thus making the empirical investigation much more complex. We 
nevertheless consider this an avenue for future research.    
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knowledge, this possibility has not been tested empirically. Our objective is to test 
whether changes in the former has had a significant impact upon the latter in the U.S. 
economy in the last four decades.   
  Hence, we set ourselves the task of exploring the (unexplored) possibility that 
changes in labor productivity, brought about by changes in the amount of physical 
capital relative to output, are not fully translated into changes in real wages for a long 
enough time span so they may lead to changes in the equilibrium rate of unemployment. 
For that purpose, we present a simple model characterizing an economy where 
imperfect competition prevails in the product market and wage increases are bargained 
over by firms and workers. We obtain an expression for the equilibrium rate of 
unemployment, or NAIRU, that is then estimated using co-integration techniques in the 
context of the VAR methodology. The model is estimated using quarterly data obtained 
mostly from the EcoWin Pro database for the period 1964q2 to 2003q1 for the United 
States economy.
 4 Our empirical results challenge conventional wisdom in the field, for 
they lend strong support for the hypothesis that the aggregate capital-output ratio was 
one significant determinant of the NAIRU in the United States in the last four decades. 
Results also suggest that the real price of imports and capacity utilization were 
significant determinants of the NAIRU, whereas factors like technical change and long-
term unemployment did not affect the NAIRU significantly.        
Since we obtained that the U.S. NAIRU depends negatively on the aggregate 
capital-output ratio and, hence, positively on the level of real interest rates, these results 
identify a link between capital stock and unemployment that has been unexplored 
empirically to this date. We believe our findings shed new light and qualify previous 
results in the literature on the presence of hysteresis in labor markets (Cross 1995; 
Blanchard and Summers 1987; Franz 1987 and 1990; Sachs 1987) and are of relevance 
to, among other topics, the effects of disinflation episodes on equilibrium 
unemployment (Fortin 1996; Romer and Romer 1989; Ball 1997 and 1999), the choice 
of identification restrictions in VAR models (Blanchard and Quah 1989; Galí 1992) and 
the debate on the causes of European unemployment (Ball 1997 and 1999; Blanchard 
and Wolfers 2000; Bibow 2001 and 2005; Hein and Truger 2005).  
                                                 
4 EcoWin Database consists of economic and financial data collected from more than seven hundred 
primary sources as OECD, IMF, and Bureau of Labor Statistics, among others. 
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The content of the paper is as follows. Section II reviews the empirical literature 
on this topic. Section III displays a simple theoretical model that yields an expression of 
the NAIRU that is subsequently used for estimation purposes. The empirical 
investigation appears in section IV. Section V summarizes our findings and concludes.  
 
II   REVIEW OF THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 
 
As argued above, a number of authors have discussed the role of capital in explaining 
unemployment. However, recent discussions on this topic have tended to adopt the 
influential work of Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (1991) as the starting point for formal 
discussions. These authors impose restrictions on the price and wage equation such that 
the rate of unemployment is unaffected by technical progress and changes in the 
aggregate capital-labor ratio. In particular, they impose an equality of coefficients on the 
trend productivity term in the price and wage equation to the effect that any shift in the 
real product wage-employment relationship derived from pricing considerations 
generates a corresponding shift in the wage-setting equation, such that the equilibrium 
level of unemployment does not change so the benefits of higher productivity always 
feed through into higher real wages (Sawyer 2002). As Layard, Nickell, and Jackman 
(1991) recognize, were these coefficients to differ, then unemployment would either rise 
or fall continuously with trend productivity growth. They argue that the absence of such 
a trend in unemployment over centuries is consistent with their framework (Layard, 
Nickell, and Jackman 1991). 
However, as has been the case of some European economies, the NAIRU may 
well exhibit a trend over several decades. One possible source of persistent changes in 
the NAIRU is changes in the aggregate capital-output ratio. In particular, a higher 
capital stock relative to output (or labor) raises labor productivity, thereby mitigating 
inflationary pressures and allowing the economy to operate with a lower rate of 
unemployment. But real wage aspirations will tend to adjust upwards. As noted in 
Blanchard and Katz (1997), the equilibrium rate of unemployment or NAIRU, i.e., the 
rate of unemployment compatible with a constant rate of inflation in the absence of 
transitory supply shocks, depends on the level of productivity in relation to the 
reservation wage, as well as on many other factors. Accepting this then, if real wage 
aspirations do not fully offset the effects of capital accumulation and/or technical   5
progress for a period spanning, say one decade or more, then the rate of unemployment 
will exhibit a (downward) trend for some time.
5  
A similar argument has been put by Ball and Mankiw (2002). They argue that in 
a neoclassical world, a rise in productivity growth has no obvious effect on inflation 
because higher productivity is reflected fully in higher real wages. Nonetheless, and 
building on the work of Grubb, Jackman, and Layard (1982), Stiglitz (1997), and 
Blinder (2000), they suggest there is a link between shifts in productivity growth and the 
NAIRU that may help explain both the rising NAIRU of the 1970s and the falling 
NAIRU of the 1990s in the United States economy.
6 According to them, all we need to 
accept is that “wage aspirations” adjust slowly to shifts in productivity growth.
7 In 
particular, Ball and Mankiw argue that:  
 
“If productivity growth falls, as in the 1970s, fundamentals dictate that real-wage 
growth must fall as well. Workers resist this decrease, however; they try to maintain the wage 
increases to which they are accustomed. To the extent that workers have some influence over 
wages, this means that wage setters will try to achieve real-wage increases above the level that 
can be sustained by productivity growth. This mismatch between real-wage aspirations and 
productivity growth worsens the inflation-unemployment tradeoff. In other words, the NAIRU 
rises… Today´s version of the story reverses the signs. Productivity has accelerated but workers 
have become accustomed to the slow wage growth since the 1970s. A mismatch of productivity 
and wage aspirations in this direction shifted the Phillips curve favourably” (Ball and Mankiw 
2002). 
 
There is at least one more channel through which capital stock may affect the 
equilibrium rate of unemployment. In the work by Rowthorn (1977), and in several 
subsequent studies, wage and price setting behavior depend on the state of demand in 
the particular market. Unemployment is a disciplinary device that reduces the ability of 
workers to push up wages, while excess productive capacity limits the ability of firms to 
raise prices. Therefore, additional productive capacity reduces the inflationary conflict 
                                                 
5 Blanchard and Katz (1997) argue that the conditions that deliver long-run neutrality of the natural rate to 
changes in productivity need not hold as a matter of logic, but they all appear plausible. Reversing their 
argument, we may argue that, even if long-run neutrality may appear plausible, it does not hold as a 
matter of logic and so there is no need to impose it a priori.    
 
6 In the pioneering work by Grubb, Jackman, and Layard (1982), the stagflation suffered by OECD 
economies since 1975 was attributed partly to rising relative import prices and partly to the fall in the rate 
of productivity growth relative to workers’ target rate of growth of real wages. 
 
7 They also mention that Alan Greenspan (1997) “has suggested that workers, cowed by job insecurity, 
lacked aggressiveness in wage negotiations” (Ball and Mankiw 2002). However, they point out that what 
matters is aggressiveness of workers relative to productivity so that failure to impose on firms a higher 
rate of growth of real (product) wages when productivity accelerates will have the same effect on the 
NAIRU as an exogenous decrease in workers’ degree of aggressiveness.     
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over income distribution by preventing firms from raising profit margins and, thus, 
reducing the wage share. The impact of capital accumulation on equilibrium 
unemployment through this channel has been explored for the case of Germany and the 
U.K. in Arestis and Biefang-Frisancho Mariscal (1998 and 2000). Using cointegration 
techniques, their empirical results suggest that unemployment rose in the 80s and 90s 
due to insufficient investment. However, we believe their results are subject to the 
objection that the theoretical model they estimate predicts that firms’ profit margins are 
pro-cyclical. Yet, the empirical evidence on the relationship between profit margins and 
capacity utilization (or, more generally, between market power and business 
fluctuations is mixed). 
  The link between unemployment and capital accumulation has also been 
recently explored empirically in Stockhammer (2004). He compares the NAIRU 
hypothesis regarding European unemployment and a Keynesian approach. The theories 
are tested using time series data for Germany, France, Italy, the U.K., and the United 
States using the seemingly unrelated regression method. He finds that a simple NAIRU 
specification performs poorly and that the Keynesian approach is more successful with 
the rate of capital accumulation being a significant determinant of employment growth 
in all countries. However, the simple NAIRU specification he tests empirically does not 
address the potential effect of technical change and changes in the aggregate capital-
output ratio on the NAIRU.  
The theoretical model we display in Section III below takes inspiration from the 
work of Allen and Nixon (1997). The authors present a model of the NAIRU similar to 
the model in Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (1991) and drop the cross-equation 
restriction on the capital-labor ratio in the price and wage equation. They justify this 
departure from Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (1991) by arguing that setting such 
restriction “obscures the fact that there are actually two processes taking place: capital 
accumulation and technological progress” (Allen and Nixon 1997). As a result of 
dropping this assumption, they show that the NAIRU is a function of relative factor 
prices and of the rate of accumulation so that there will be no unique short-run NAIRU. 
Besides, they argue that the level of interest rates and the rate of growth of aggregate 
demand determine a whole locus of equilibrium unemployment rates. However, the 
authors do not estimate their model and, to the best of our knowledge, no attempt has 
been made to this date to test empirically for the effect on the NAIRU of changes in the 
aggregate capital-labor ratio and technical change. Finally, the theoretical connection   7
between the NAIRU and the aggregate capital-labor ratio is also addressed in Rowthorn 
(1999), although his results only apply to the case of a CES production function, where 
the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor is less than unity.   
 
III  A THEORETICAL MODEL OF UNEMPLOYMENT DETERMINATION 
AND THE ROLE OF CAPITAL STOCK 
 
In this section, we put forward a model that aims to explain the determination of the rate 
of unemployment in the presence of trade unions and imperfectly-competitive product 
markets. Central to the model is the effect of capital stock on unemployment. Unlike 
some studies that postulate that the long-run impact of capital accumulation on the rate 
of unemployment occurs through the impact of the former on firms’ mark-ups, we 
postulate a different framework in which capital stock affects unemployment mainly 
through its effect on the marginal product of labor. The short-run profit maximizing 
decision facing the typical firm, i, consists of maximizing profits  










t − = Π                                                        (1) 
where  p
i
t  is the price charged for its output Y
i
t  by firm i, w
e
t  is the expectation of future 
labor costs per employee, N
i
t  is employment and the subscript t denotes time. The 
decision variables for the firm are taken to be output (and thus, employment) and the 
price charged for it. For the sake of convenience, we assume that the economy consists 
of a number, n, of identical and fully integrated firms using equal amounts of labor and 
capital and similar technology. This assumption allows us to simplify substantially the 
firms’ price-setting equation since we only need to consider one variable production 
factor, i.e., labor. Hence, the first-order condition of the optimization problem faced by 
the typical firm yields the following economy-wide relation: 









m p                                                          (2) 
where Ω
N
t  is the marginal product of labor and mt  is equal to one plus the average 
mark-up set by the typical firm. Under imperfect competition we have that: 
















m t                                                (3)   8
Hence, the size of the (average) mark-up depends inversely on the price-
elasticity of demand ε
d
t  and, as we argue below, the latter may well vary cyclically.  
          Next, we assume that the technology available to firms is represented by a Cobb-
Douglas production function so that the economy-wide output is equal to: 
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where Kt  is the amount of physical capital available to firms, a is a distribution 
parameter, γ 0 is a constant, and λ1 is the rate of technical change.
8 Differentiating (4) 
with respect to employment, we can obtain the marginal product of labor or:  
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  Likewise, the marginal product of capital is: 
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  Insofar as the typical firm combines capital and labor so as to minimize costs, 
we have that: 












=                                                  (7) 
where w/p is the real price of labor and r is the rental price of capital services. 
Combining expressions (4), (5), (6), and (7) we can express the marginal product 
of labor as:  
                                            ) / (
) 1 ( ) / ( / 1
0
1 Y K a a
a t a a N
t e
−
⋅ ⋅ ⋅ = Ω
λ γ                                        (8)                       
Our approach to wage determination starts from the notion that both workers and 
firms typically have some bargaining power. The bargaining power of workers stems 
from the fact that they cannot be costlessly replaced. Likewise, the bargaining power of 
firms arises because workers cannot costlessly locate an equivalent job. We assume that 
workers bargain with a view to obtaining a target real (consumption) wage. This implies 
that they will resist any attempt by firms to reduce real (product) wages, as well as any 
loss of purchasing power stemming from any factor that may drive a wedge between the 
former and workers’ purchasing power, e.g., taxes levied on consumption goods and/or 
                                                 
8 Technological progress comes with structural change. Increases in the pace of technological progress are 
likely to come with a higher pace of reallocation across jobs and, to the extent that this leads to larger 
flows of workers in the labor market, these will lead to a higher unemployment rate. However, and for 
simplicity, we consider a form of technological progress that affects total factor productivity but does not 
affect the organization of production in any other way.   
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labor income and variations in the real price of imported consumption goods. As a result 
of it, the actual wage outcome is given by: 




t t t e ⋅ ⋅ =
λ ϕ ω
2 ) , (                                                  (9) 
where wt is the actual money wage,  p
e
t  is the expected price level, ϕt  is the cost to 
workers of losing their job, I is the real price of imports,  0 2 f λ  is the (trend) rate of 
growth of workers’ real reservation wage, i.e., the wage that makes a worker indifferent 
to being employed or unemployed, and  0 p ωϕ  and  0 f ωI  are partial derivatives. In 
turn, the real price of imports can be expressed as:   





=                                                         (10) 
where E is the price of foreign currency, p is the domestic price level, and  pm is the 
price of imports in terms of foreign currency.  
Next, we assume that the cost to workers of losing their job, ϕ , depends 
inversely on: (i) the probability of finding another job, which in turn depends inversely 
on the current rate of unemployment (U) and (ii) the ratio of long-term unemployed to 
total unemployed (LU).
9 Therefore, we define ϕt  as: 
                                             ) , ( LU U t t t ϕ ϕ =                                                    (11)  
where we assume that ϕt  is log-linear and  0 f ϕU ,  0 p ϕ LU .  
Expressions (9) and (11) require some explanation. They make workers’ target 
real wage depend inversely on the cost of job loss, as well as on a real wage resistance 
factor, such as the real price of imports.
10 An increase in the unemployment rate raises 
                                                 
9 The cost to workers of losing their job may also be affected by changes in the replacement ratio. 
However, as noted in Blanchard and Katz (1997), in the United States, the ratio of average weekly 
unemployment benefits to average weekly wages for workers covered by unemployment insurance has 
been remarkably stable over the last 50 years, despite the peak in 1976 due to a transitory effect of a 
reform and enlargement of the American Unemployment Insurance. This stability was confirmed by the 
unit root tests we ran on a measure of the replacement ratio, which showed that the latter is I(0). If we add 
to this the fact that the replacement ratio is an exogenous variable from a theoretical perspective, we have 
that it will be part of the short-term adjustment dynamics but will not be part of the long-term 
relationships. Hence, and given the difficulty of estimating a VAR model containing many variables, we 
opted to leave the replacement ratio out of the theoretical model.  
 
10 Another possible resistance factor that could possibly affect the target real wage is taxation. Yet, the 
empirical literature on the NAIRU using time-series data has not attributed a significant effect of taxation 
on the equilibrium rate of unemployment. In addition, the analysis of several measures of the percentage 
of workers’ income that they regularly pay as taxes and social security contributions, excluding 
Government transfers to households and a number of public services directly enjoyed by the latter showed 
they all are I(0). Insofar as this variable can also be deemed exogenous in our theoretical model, we 
opted, as in the case of the replacement ratio, to exclude it from the model from the start.    10
the cost of job loss and makes it easier for firms to replace currently employed workers. 
This stems from the fact that in a depressed labor market, workers know that finding 
another job is likely to be difficult, so they will be willing to settle for a lower wage. In 
this case, the target real wage will be low and close to the workers’ reservation wage.
11 
Conversely, in tight labor markets, the target real wage will be much higher than the 
reservation wage. Hence, even if the reservation wage were constant overtime, the 
target real wage would vary with labor market conditions.  
The positive sign for the effect of the long-term unemployed (LU) on the target 
real wage may be explained by reference to membership theories. As argued above, 
high rates of unemployment tend to moderate wage claims; however, it is only the 
effective labor supply, i.e., the “insiders” that determine wage negotiations (Lindbeck 
and Snower 1988). If the composition of the unemployed changes in such a way that the 
ratio of the long-term unemployed rises, “insiders” may press for higher wages since 
there are fewer effective competitors for a given number of jobs. In turn, this stems 
from the fact that the long-term unemployed may not be perceived by employers as 
good substitutes for current incumbent workers, owing to the depreciation of their skills 
and the loss of work motivation in the unemployed or simply because the long-term 
unemployed may become less effective in their job search
12 (Blanchard et al. 1986; 
Franz 1987).  
Next, models based on notions of fairness suggest that the reservation wage may 
depend on such factors as the level and rate of growth of wages in the past and if 
workers have come to consider such wage increases as fair (Akerlof and Yellen 1990). 
Perhaps a better word than reservation wage in this context is “aspiration” wage 
(Oswald 1986). The latter is determined by all the factors that the literature has 
identified as determining the reservation wage, plus the aspiration for a steady 
improvement in living standards. As such, the rate of increase of the “aspiration” wage 
                                                                                                                                               
   
11 The inverse relationship between the target real wage and the rate of unemployment can also be derived 
from efficiency wage considerations. For instance, the “shirking” model of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) 
leads to a wage relation in which the tighter the labor market is the higher is the wage that firms have to 
pay to prevent shirking. 
 
12 It has also been argued that sociological factors may increase the reservation wage of the unemployed: 
a long period of unemployment changes society’s attitudes toward the unemployed. It becomes more 
socially acceptable to be unemployed and to use existing social benefits to their utmost (Lindbeck 1995). 
Furthermore, family insurance may also develop to help the unemployed, in particular the unemployed 
youth. 
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will be determined, at least partly, by a wide range of idiosyncratic socioeconomic and 
historical factors. The (positive) time trend on equation (9) can be envisaged as 
capturing workers’ aspiration to ever-rising living standards. An additional rationale for 
the time trend is the notion that the reservation wage (regardless of wage aspiration 
considerations) depends on the various types of income support that the unemployed 
can expect to receive if unemployed from unemployment benefits to other social 
insurance programs. If all these increase over time and are roughly in line with labor 
productivity, then the reservation wage will exhibit a time trend.  
Insofar as workers bargain over a target (consumption) real wage, we also need 
to take into account the wedge between product wages and consumption wages. This 
wedge includes not only taxes on labor net of income transfers from the government to 
workers, but also includes the discrepancy between the GDP deflator and the consumer 
price index. For reasons explained above, the former were not considered in the 
theoretical model. As for the latter, it depends mainly on the real price of imports (I).
13 
Therefore, to the extent that workers exhibit some degree of real wage resistance, 
increases in the real price of imports will induce upward pressure on the real product 
wage and vice-versa. Next, if we insert (11) into (9), assume that function ω  is log-
linear, and take logarithms in (9) we get: 
                      t i lu u p w t i t lu t u
e
t t λ ω ω ω ω 2 ln ln + + + + = −                                (12) 
where the logarithms of the arguments in ω  are denoted by lower-case letters, ω  can 
be interpreted as the “aspiration” (real) wage at the initial period,  0 p ωU  and  0 f ωLU . 
  Some studies find that firms’ mark-ups exhibit cyclical patterns. However, there 
is no consensus as to whether they are pro-cyclical or counter-cyclical (see, for instance, 
Hall 1986; Bils 1987; Rotemberg and Woodford 1991; Chirinko and Fazzari 1994; and 
Galeotti and Schiantarelli 1998). A discussion of the vast literature on the relation 
between firms’ market power and macroeconomic fluctuations exceeds the aims of this 
study. Hence, we adopt an agnostic approach and propose an indirect way of capturing 
the possible cyclicality of mark-ups. In particular, we hypothesize that mark-ups are set 
according to: 
                                                           C m m t t
φ ⋅ =                                                          (13) 
                                                 
13 It also depends on excise taxes, but we decided to leave aside this variable due to data availability 
problems. 
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where Ct  is aggregate capacity utilization, m  is the average mark-up set by firms when 
,1 = Ct  and the sign of φ  is a priori uncertain. Expression (13) means that the price-
elasticity of demand varies according to the phase of the business cycle the economy is 
currently at, where the latter is captured by aggregate capacity utilisation. Insofar as 
firms’ mark-ups are determined by capacity utilization, the latter will affect the NAIRU, 
e.g., if  0 f φ , then increases in capacity utilization will raise the NAIRU and vice-versa. 
If we take logarithms in (13) we get: 
                                                   c m m t t ⋅ + = φ ln ln                                                     (14) 
where  C c t t ln =  and taking logarithms in (2) and (8) yields, respectively: 




t t m w p ln ln ln ln                                             (15) 
and                                         k t t t
N Ω + ⋅ Ω + Ω = Ω 2 1 0 ln                                              (16) 










Inserting (14) and (16) into (15) yields: 
                                   k t c m w p t t
e
t t Ω − Ω − Ω − + = − 2 1 0 ln ln ln φ                               (17)   
We define long-run equilibrium as a situation where exogenous factors are kept 
fixed and expectations are fulfilled. If expectations are fulfilled, we have that  w w
e
t t =  
and  p p
e
t t = , hence, (12) and (17) become respectively: 
                        t i lu u p w t i t lu t u t t λ ω ω ω ω 2 ln ln + + + + = −                            (18) 
                         k t c m w p t t t t Ω − Ω − Ω − + = − 2 1 0 ln ln ln φ                             (19) 
Hence, when there is long-run equilibrium in the sense defined above, the 
current rate of unemployment is equal to the NAIRU. Thus, we can solve for the 
equilibrium level of unemployment u
* as: 
                             c d k d i d lu d t d d u t t t t t 5 4 3 2 1 0







































= 5  and the sign of d 0, d1, and d5  is a priori ambiguous.  
  Expression (20) above is subsequently used as a benchmark for estimation 
purposes in the empirical work presented below. It tells us that the NAIRU depends 
positively on long-term unemployment and the real price of imports and negatively on   13
the capital-output ratio. It also tells us that it will shift over time in a way determined by 
the sign of d1 if wage aspirations do not grow in line with total factor productivity and 
that changes in capacity utilization will affect the NAIRU in an unknown way a priori 
(it will depend on the actual sign of d5 ). Finally, it tells us that the NAIRU depends on 
all the factors embedded in d 0, such as the parameters of the production function, the 
wage, and the mark-up equation. To the extent that the NAIRU is a negative function of 
the capital-output ratio and the latter is itself a positive function of the ratio of the real 
wage to the rental price of capital services, the model predicts a positive relationship 
between real interest rates and the NAIRU. We turn to the testing of this hypothesis.       
    
IV EMPIRICAL  INVESTIGATION 
 
The first part of this section discusses the data set utilized. This is followed by the 
presentation of the results derived from the estimation of the cointegrating relationships.   
 
Variable Definition and Data 
The model is estimated using quarterly and seasonally adjusted data for the period 
1964q2 to 2003q1 for the United States. This was dictated by data availability, since 
data on the NAIRU are only available from 1964q2 onwards. Most data was obtained 
from the EcoWin Pro database, which collects data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA) NIPA Tables, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), and the U.S. 
Federal Reserve (Fed). Data on the NAIRU for the United States was obtained from the 
OECD. Next, we define and discuss briefly each variable used in the estimations. 
Capital stock (K) is defined as the stock of private non-residential fixed assets at current 
prices (BEA, NIPA Table 4.1) deflated by a price index for gross private non-residential 
domestic investment (BEA, NIPA Table 1.6.4, Line 23). Annual data were converted 
into quarterly data utilizing the facility incorporated in the EcoWin database. Real 
output (Y) is defined as Real Gross Domestic Product (BEA, NIPA Table 1.1.3). 
Capacity utilization (C) is defined as capacity utilization for the manufacturing sector 
and the original source is the U.S. Fed. We used the manufacturing sector index rather 
than the general one because the latter is not available before 1967. We define long-
term unemployment (LU) as the ratio of long-term unemployed to the total number of 
unemployed. In turn, the BLS defines long-term unemployed as those workers who   14
have been unemployed for at least 27 weeks. The real price of imports (I) is calculated 
as the ratio of a price index of import goods measured in domestic currency divided by 
the consumer price index. Both price indexes were obtained from the EcoWin database. 
Finally, data on the NAIRU (see Figure 1 below) were obtained from the OECD. 
Details on the construction of the time series can be found in Richardson et al. (2000).     
    
Econometric Specification 
The aim of the empirical part of the paper is to test whether there is a long-term 
equilibrium relationship between the NAIRU and the aggregate capital-output ratio once 
we control for the rest of variables embedded in the theoretical model. For that purpose, 
we use a cointegrated VAR model (for a presentation of this methodology, see Johansen 
1995). This maximum likelihood methodology uses as a benchmark a VAR of order k 
containing p variables or:  
                               t t k t p t t t D X X X X ε φ φ φ + Φ + + + + = − − − ... 2 2 1 1         T t ,..., 1 =               (21)                 
where  t ε  are independently distributed Gaussian errors with zero mean and variance Ω  
and  t D  captures the deterministic terms. Matrix  t X  contains  ) 1 (px  time series. This 
) (k VAR model can be expressed as an error correction model or: 
                             t t t k t k t t D X X X X ε + Φ + Π + ∆ Γ + + ∆ Γ = ∆ − + − − − 1 1 1 1 1 ...       T t ,..., 1 =        (22)    
where  ∑ = − = Π
k
i i I 1φ ,  ∑ + = − = Γ
k
i j j i 1φ . 
If  t X ∼ ) 1 ( I  and  t X ∆ ∼ ) 0 ( I , matrix Π cannot have full rank. If rank r  is equal to 
zero, then this means that there is no cointegration relationship among the variables. If 
p r p , then matrix Π can be decomposed as  β α ′ = Π  where α  and β  are each a 
) ( r p×  matrix containing parameters. In particular, matrix β  contains the r  
cointegration relationships and matrix α  contains the adjustment parameters. As for the 
specification of the deterministic terms, we assume the existence of a linear time trend 
that is restricted to the cointegration space, i.e., if  t Dt 1 0 µ µ + = Φ  and the parameters  i µ  
can themselves be decomposed as  i i i γ α αρ µ ⊥ + =  for  1 , 0 = i , we then assume that 
t Dt 1 0 0 αρ γ α αρ + + = Φ ⊥ . 
The choice of this specification stems from the fact that the theoretical model 
expounded above allows for the possibility that such a time trend exists whenever the 
wage aspirations of workers do not grow over time in line with the growth of total 
factor productivity. In addition, a preliminary inspection of the time path of variables   15
such as the NAIRU, the aggregate capital-output ratio, and the real price of imports 
suggests that they may, indeed, possess a time trend.  
The real price of imports is an exogenous variable in our analysis. Likewise, our 
theoretical model suggests that the aggregate capital-output ratio is, at least partly, 
exogenous. This stems from the fact that the latter is determined by technology, 
expectations, and the ratio of the rental price of capital to the price of labor. In turn, the 
rental price of capital is strongly influenced by the stance of monetary policy. This 
allows for the possibility that the capital-output ratio exhibits some degree of 
endogeneity insofar as changes in the NAIRU brought about by changes in any variable 
of the model other than the capital-output ratio may lead to changes in the stance of 
monetary policy provided the central bank targets inflation, which has arguably been the 
case of the U.S. Fed in the period considered. However, the exogeneity tests performed 
showed unambiguously that the aggregate capital-output ratio is exogenous (see Table 5 
below).    
Using a partial model, i.e., a model which imposes from the start the condition 
that some variables are weakly exogenous, has a number of advantages. First, it allows 
us to reduce the dimension of the system. Second, it makes the interpretation of results 
easier. Following Harbo et al. (1998), let us assume that  t X  can be decomposed into  t Y  
and  t Z , and that the following matrices can, in turn, be decomposed as: 


































1                                           (23) 
A partial model for  t Y ∆  can be defined as: 
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k
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) ( ε β ωα α ω + Φ + ∆ Γ + − + ∆ = ∆ −
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− Ω Ω = ω ,  i i i 2 1 1
~
Γ − Γ = Γ ω ,  2 1 1
~
Φ − Φ = Φ ω ,  t t t 2 1 1
~ ωε ε ε − = .  
In turn, the marginal model for  t Z ∆  is represented by: 
                                      t t i t
k
i





2 ε β α + Φ + ∆ Γ + = ∆ −
−
=
− ∑                                 (25)  
If  0 2 = α , then the variables in  t Z  are weakly exogenous. This means that they 
do not possess an error correction term or, alternatively, that there is no information 
about β  in the marginal model. Partial models pose some problems when trying to 
make inferences about the cointegrating rank. This is because the limit distribution 
depends on both the deterministic terms and the nuisance parameters. Notwithstanding   16
this problem, Harbo et al. (1998) show that when we consider a time trend restricted to 
the cointegration vector, the limit distribution is free of nuisance parameters which, in 
turn, makes inferences about the cointegrating rank possible as long as: (i) the system is 
generated by a VAR model so variables do not exhibit an order of integration higher 
than one and, (ii) variables in  t Z  are weakly exogenous so that the cointegrating rank is 
equal or less that the dimension of  t Y .  
Tables 1 to 3 below show the tests utilized to determine the order of integration 
of time series. In addition to ADF unit root tests, we implemented the tests proposed in 
Ng and Perron
14 (2001) and Elliott, Rothenberg, and Stock (1996), as well as the 
stationarity tests elaborated in Kwiatkowski et al. (1992). Results strongly suggest that 
the NAIRU, the aggregate capital-output ratio, and the real price of imports are all 
integrated or order 1 or I(1). By contrast, results for long-term unemployment and 
capacity utilization suggest that they both could be I(0), albeit these results depend, to 
some extent, on the type of test implemented and the specification chosen for the data 
generating process.
15 
Table 4 below provides the information related to the determination of the 
cointegration rank for the whole system. In addition to the trace test, we used 
information provided by the roots of the companion matrix and the t statistics associated 
to the adjustment coefficients
16. The number of lags of the VAR model that minimizes 
the Schwarz and Hannan-Quinn criteria is three. In turn, the cointegration rank appears 
to be equal to two
17 and, for this cointegration rank, the tests implemented indicate that 
we cannot reject the hypothesis that the real price of imports and the capital-output ratio 
are  weakly exogenous in the complete model (see Table 5 below). As a result, we opted 
                                                 
14 These authors develop the M tests to allow for GLS detrending of the data and, in addition, propose the 
use of a Modified Information Criteria for selecting the number of lags in the context of unit root tests. In 
particular, they argue that commonly used information criteria tend to select a low number of lags which, 
according to them, is inappropriate when the errors contain a moving-average root that is close to –1. As a 
result, in this study we used the Modified Akaike Information Criteria (MAIC).  
 
15 We also ran unit root tests with the series expressed in first differences and in all cases we found that 
we could reject the hypothesis that they were I(2).  
 
16 Of course, we also took into account the figures displaying the cointegration relations. In addition, we 
also provide the trace test statistics after having implemented the Barlett corrections (see Johansen 2002). 
 
17 If r = 2 we have that the result of the trace test after implementing the Barlett´s corrections is slightly 
lower than the critical value at the 5% significance level. Nevertheless, the visual analysis of the figure 
associated to the second cointegration relation and the fact that the adjustment coefficients of both the 
NAIRU and capacity utilization are significant led us to assume that r = 2.   
   17
to consider them as such from the start and performed the empirical analysis using a 
partial system.  
 
The Estimated Long-Run Relations 
Table 6 below presents results related to the determination of the cointegrating rank of 
the partial system  ) , , (
'
t t t t c lu u Y
∗ = , ) , (
'
t t t i k Z = . As pointed out above, our VAR(3) 
model contains a linear time trend that is restricted to the cointegration space. Results in 
Table 6 suggest that the cointegrating rank for the partial system is two as for the full 
system.
18 We implemented a number of tests in order to detect problems associated with 
possible model misspecification. Results suggest that there is neither autocorrelation in 
the residuals of the unrestricted VAR, nor heterokedasticity. Unfortunately, residuals do 
not seem to follow a normal distribution. Notwithstanding this normality problem, 
Gonzalo (1994) argues that the maximum likelihood principle in an error correction 
model exhibits better properties than other methodologies when used for estimating 
cointegration relations, even if errors are non-normally distributed.
19 
Table 7 below shows results for the exclusion and stationarity tests. We 
performed an analysis of their sensitivity with respect to the cointegrating rank for r=1 
and r=2. Results lend strong support to the claim that none of the variables analyzed is 
stationary
20 and, in addition, long-term unemployment is not included in any of the two 
cointegration relations. Table 8 presents results for the weak exogeneity tests. It can be 
seen that none of the variables can be deemed exogenous. Table 9 shows the identified 
structure for the long-run relations. The overidentifying restrictions are accepted with a 
p-value equal to 2.16 according to the test  34 . 0 ) 2 (
2 = χ . The first relation—see 
expression (26) below―tells us that there exists a cointegration relation encompassing 
the NAIRU, the aggregate capital-output ratio, capacity utilization, and the real price of 
imports (t-ratios are shown in parentheses): 
                                                 
18 The visual analysis of the figures associated with the cointegration relations in the partial model made 
us discard the possibility that the cointegration rank be equal to 3. 
 
19 This author argues that the methodology proposed by Johansen represents a particular case of reduced 
rank simultaneous least squares where the condition that residuals must follow a given type of distribution 
is not imposed. 
 
20 The stationarity tests inserted in that figure were carried out under the assumption that the cointegration 
vector includes a time trend. However, even if the time trend is assumed away, we can still reject the 
hypothesis that the variables are stationary.  
   18
                                                t t t t i k c u 24 . 0 46 . 0 18 . 1 + − − =
∗                                      (26) 
                                                                (7.94)     (9.16)     (7.42) 
  
The negative coefficient of the aggregate capital-output ratio means that an 
increase in its value will lead to a fall in equilibrium unemployment and vice-versa. 
Likewise, the negative coefficient attached to capacity utilization can be interpreted in 
the context of our model as the outcome of the counter-cyclical behavior of firms’ 
average mark-ups. However, other possibilities cannot be discarded. As an example, 
this negative coefficient may be the result of the counter-cyclical behavior of firms’ 
total average costs or of the impact on the NAIRU of changes in actual unemployment 
occurring through hysteresis effects unrelated to long-term unemployment, as we 
measured above. By contrast, an increase in the real price of imports raises equilibrium 
unemployment and vice-versa. Figure 1 (below) illustrates how the two oil crises (1973 
and 1979), especially the first one, affected the evolution of the NAIRU. As for the time 
trend, we cannot reject the hypothesis that it is not part of the cointegration relation. 
This suggests that, at least for the period considered, wage aspirations grew over time, 
roughly in line with total factor productivity but, crucially, they did not adjust fast 
enough to offset the impact on the marginal productivity of labor of changes in the 
aggregate capital-output ratio. The second relation tells us that capacity utilization is 
cointegrated with the capital-output ratio and the real price of imports or: 
                                               t i k c t t t 00 . 0 05 . 0 80 . 0 + − − =                                         (27) 
                                                        (8.75)     (2.69)      (6.98) 
  
The negative sign of the aggregate capital-output ratio stems from the fact that 
aggregate output and capital appear respectively in the numerator and denominator of 
capacity utilization. The presence of a significant, albeit negligible, linear time trend 
may be due to the presence of a time trend in the aggregate capital-output ratio in the 
period considered. Finally, the negative relation between capacity utilization and the 
real price of imports stems from the fact that an increase in the latter brings about a rise 
in the rate of inflation and, consequently, a tightening of the stance of monetary policy 
that will, in turn, reduce aggregate capacity utilization and vice-versa.   
To analyze the constancy of the estimated long-run parameters and the possible 
presence of structural change in the estimated relationships, we used the fluctuation test   19
of the eigenvalues and the LM-type test developed in Hansen and Johansen (1999). 
Since there exists a relationship among the eigenvalues, the adjustment coefficients, and 
the cointegrating vectors, the analysis of the time path of the estimated eigenvalues can 
be used to test for the constancy of the estimated long-run parameters. As can be 
observed in Figure 2, the null hypothesis of constancy cannot be rejected either for any 
of the two eigenvalues individually or for their sum because the values of the tests are 
below the 5% critical value. Figure 3 shows the LM-type test, according to which the 
estimated long-run parameters are constant over the sample period since the maximum 
value of the  t Q  test is lower than the 5% critical value. We also used the test developed 
in Hansen and Johansen (1993) to test the hypothesis that  ) (
~
τ β β sp ∈  for 
1 : 2003 3 : 1970 − = τ , where β
~
 is the estimate of the long-run parameters for the full 
sample 1964:2-2003:1 when over-identifying restrictions are imposed. In Figure 4, we 
show the test statistic we obtained. This test has been scaled using their 5% critical 
value, so that the values exceeding 1 indicate the inconstancy of β
~
. According to this 
test, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of constancy under the R representation (i.e., 
the short run parameters are fixed at their full sample values), but not under the Z 
representation (when the short run parameters are estimated recursively). However, 
Hansen and Johansen (1993) point out that the R representation is more appropriate than 
the Z one when the purpose is to analyze long-run stability.  
 
The Short-Run Adjustment 
Table 10 below presents results relating to the short-run adjustment dynamics of the 
model. Those coefficients that are significantly different from zero are heavily outlined, 
i.e., those for which the t-ratio is larger than two. We can see that the NAIRU is 
strongly equilibrium correcting to ecm1 and significantly overshoots vis á vis capacity 
utilization (ecm2), i.e., the NAIRU raises when capacity utilization is above its 
stationary state value and vice-versa. We may note that the dynamics of the NAIRU in a 
given period are positively affected by its evolution in the previous period which 
imbues this variable with a good deal of inertia. By contrast, larger increases in the 
capital-output ratio in previous periods lead to lower increases in the NAIRU in the 
current period, so the link between these two variables exists in the short-run as well as 
in the long-run.    20
As for long-term unemployment, Table 10 shows that its value falls when the 
NAIRU exceeds its stationary state value and vice-versa. This could be easily accounted 
for if, as in the theoretical model, these two variables were positively related. However, 
the empirical analysis yielded that long-term unemployment can be excluded from both 
cointegration relations. Finally, capacity utilization is equilibrium correcting to ecm2. 
We may also note that its current period dynamics are positively influenced by its 
evolution in the preceding period and that an increase in the capital-output ratio reduces 
its current increase and vice-versa.  
 
V  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The purpose of this paper was to examine the proposition that capital stock relative to 
aggregate output has been an important variable in the determination of unemployment 
in the United States economy, at least in the last four decades. This proposition runs 
against conventional wisdom in the field which holds that persistent unemployment is 
mainly the result of a number of labor market rigidities. This position is well 
exemplified in the influential work of Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (1991) where they 
impose cross-equation restrictions which ensure that the rate of unemployment is 
unaffected by technical progress and changes in the aggregate capital-labor ratio. The 
crucial assumption lying at the core of this position is that changes in productivity, 
whatever their cause, are automatically reflected in equivalent changes in real wages, so 
the NAIRU is unaffected by the former. Yet, a number of authors have recently claimed 
that real wage aspirations are tied down to wage and productivity growth in the past so 
it may take some time before they fully adjust to changes in productivity growth. If so, 
the NAIRU will be affected in the meantime. One possible, but still unexplored, source 
of changes in productivity growth is changes in the aggregate capital-output ratio. 
Whether or not the latter leads to significant changes in the NAIRU is ultimately an 
empirical question.  
This paper presented new empirical evidence obtained from the application of 
the cointegrated VAR methodology to U.S. time-series data, which lends strong support 
to the claim that the aggregate capital-output ratio, the real price of imports, and 
capacity utilization were significant determinants of the NAIRU in the U.S. economy in 
the last four decades. In particular, increases in the aggregate capital-output ratio and 
capacity utilization and decreases in the real price of imports were found to be   21
associated with significant decreases in the NAIRU. The same evidence showed that we 
cannot reject the hypotheses that technical progress and changes in long-term 
unemployment did not affect the NAIRU in the same period. Contrary to conventional 
wisdom, this evidence suggests that, insofar as the aggregate capital-output ratio is 
affected by changes in real interest rates, then the stance of monetary policy has a 
considerable impact on the NAIRU. In particular, a policy of using short-term interest 
rates to control inflation may well be successful in the short run by reducing aggregate 
demand but it has also negative implications for supply, bringing closer the point where 
the economy runs into inflationary problems. Thus, interest rate policy in itself is no 
panacea. It does have supply-side consequences in that it only delivers low inflation 
through low growth and high unemployment. To finish off this section, we should like 
to conclude that, given the absence of empirical studies of this type for other OECD 
economies, any final verdict on the theoretical relevance of our results will have to wait 
for the emergence of further evidence on the empirical significance of capital deepening 
as a determinant of the NAIRU for other economies. Hopefully, our research agenda 
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FIGURES AND TABLES 
 
Table 1. Ng-Perron unit root tests 
  GLS MZα  
GLS
t MZ  
GLS MSB  
GLS
T MP  








































(***), (**) and (*) indicate respectively that we can reject the null hypothesis of a unit root at the 
1%, 5% and 10% significance level. We obtained the critical values from Ng and Perron (2001, 
table 1). In the first row the tests include a constant and in the second row they include a constant 
and a trend.  The criteria used to choose the number of lags was the Modified Akaike Information 
Criterion (MAIC), with  ( ) ( ) 13 100 / 12 int 4 / 1
max = = T k . 
 
          
                     Table 2. ADF and Elliott-Rothenberg-Stock (ERS) unit root tests 
  ADF        ERS 
  [1] [2] [3]  µ
T P  
τ
T P  
∗ u   -0.34 -1.30 -1.27  26.66  31.44 
k   0.01 -1.75  -1.93*  295.24  12.25 
lu  -1.83 -3.39* -0.82  4.14*  2.63*** 
c  -3.23** -3.61**  -0.91  2.57**  3.51*** 
i  -0.64 -1.23 -0.57  10.71  41.88 
(***), (**) and (*) indicate respectively that we can reject the null hypothesis of a unit 
root at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance level. In the ADF tests [1] includes a constant, 
[2] includes a constant and a time trend, and [3] includes neither a constant nor a time 
trend. The number of lags was chosen according to the Modified Akaike Information 
Criterion (MAIC), with  ( ) ( ) 13 100 / 12 int 4 / 1





Table 3. KPSS stationarity tests 
  µ η   τ η   
∗ u   0.92*** 0.33*** 
k   1.43*** 0.15** 
lu  0.74*** 0.12* 
c  0.45* 0.15** 
i  0.52** 0.33*** 
(***), (**) and (*) indicate respectively that we can reject the 
null hypothesis of stationarity at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance level. We used critical values provided in 
Kwiatowski et al. (1992, table 1). 
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Table 4. Determination of the cointegrating rank in the full system 
  r   r p−   Trace test Trace test* CV95 


























         The t-values of the α coefficients  Modulus of the six largest roots of the 
companion matrix    ∗ u lu   c  i   k  
1 = r        1,00; 1,00; 1.00; 1.00; 0.87; 0.79 
2 = r       1,00; 1.00; 1.00; 0.94; 0.79; 0.79 
3 = r       1.00; 1.00; 0.94; 0.92; 0.92; 0.79 
4 = r       1.00; 0.97; 0.97; 0.92; 0.92; 0.79 
) 3 ( VAR   0,98; 0,97; 0,97; 0.92; 0.92; 0.79 
1 α  
2 α  
3 α  
4 α  


























Notes: Trace test* represents the values of the trace test after having implemented the Barlett corrections. 
CV95 represents the critical values of the trace test at the 5% significance level. We obtained these values 
from MacKinnon et al. (1999).  




            Table 5. Testing for weak exogeneity in the full system 
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Note: LR tests of weak exogeneity follow a  ) (






                 Table 6. Determination of the cointegrating rank in the partial model 
  r   r p−   Trace test Trace test* CV95 
















The t-values of the α coefficients  Modulus of the six largest roots of the 
companion matrix    ∗ u lu   c 
1 = r        1,00; 1,00; 0,84; 0.84; 0.80 
2 = r       1,00; 0,89; 0,86; 0.79; 0.79 
) 3 ( VAR   0,92; 0,91; 0,91; 0.79; 0.79 
1 α  
2 α  










Notes: Trace test* indicates the values of the trace test after having implemented the 
Barlett corrections. CV95 indicates the critical values of the trace test at the 5% 
significance level. We obtained these values from Harbo et al. (1998, table 2). 
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Table 7. Testing for long-run exclusion and stationarity in the partial model 
  Exclusion tests     Stationarity tests  
  ∗ u   lu   c  k   i   trend   ∗ u   lu   c 






































Note: the LR tests of exclusion follow a ) (
2 r χ and the LR tests of stationarity follow a  ) 5 (
2 r − χ ; p-
values are in brackets. 
 






Table 8. Testing for weak exogeneity in the partial model 
  ∗ u   lu   c 












Note: LR tests of weak exogeneity follow a  ) (









     Table 9. Identified  β  structures in the partial model 
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The LR-test for the restricted model is  16 . 2 ) 2 (
2 = χ with p-value = 0.34; t-values 















        Table 10. The short-run structure in the partial model 
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Figure 3. LM-type test of constancy of beta. 
 
 









     Note: the critical value for sup 
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Note: the critical value at the 5% significance level is 1. 
 